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Taiwan’s Millennial Generation:
Interests in Polity and Party Politics  
Ryan BRADING 
Abstract: The political strategies used to attract Taiwanese Millen-
nials is a puzzling topic. This article analyses the strategies the two 
main political parties have implemented in recent years to do so. In 
the literature on youth attitudes in Western democracies, politics is 
described as “boring,” a “big turn-off,” and a “killjoy.” I examine to 
what degree these theoretical terms can help define the youth’s per-
ception of politics and I describe the youth-led demonstrations that 
have taken place. Using primary sources, this analysis unfolds the 
objectives, successes, and failures of the youth wings of two political 
parties founded in early 2006. The 2008 and 2012 presidential cam-
paigns are considered in relation to the theme of youth engagement. 
A key event in recent years was the March–April 2014 Sunflower 
Student Movement. The impact of this event and youth politics lead-
ing up to the 2016 presidential and legislative elections is discussed. 
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Introduction 
An analysis explaining how young Taiwanese, with different needs, 
views, and interests than those of older generations, support and 
participate in party-political activities is currently missing from the 
literature. This article aims to highlight the efforts that have been 
made since 2006 by Taiwan’s two leading parties (both of which 
formed youth wings) to reach the “hearts and minds” of the country’s 
Millennial Generation – that demographic consisting of those born 
between 1980 and 2000. This paper outlines the key historical, na-
tionalistic, and economic factors that have helped shape both Tai-
wan’s current political landscape and the composition of its two main 
political parties. 
This paper draws on a series of fieldwork interviews with various 
activists and young voters as well as with members of the Kuomin-
tang’s (KMT, ѝ഻഻≁唘, Zhongguo Guomindang, GMD) Youth 
League (YL, 䶂ᒤൈ, qingniantuan) and of the Democratic Progressive 
Party’s (DPP, ≁ѫ䙢↕唘, Minzhu Jinbudang) Youth Council (YC, 
䶂ᒤင଑ᴳ, qingnian weiyuanhui) in order to provide a rich account of 
the ways in which young people are encouraged to get involved in 
party modernisation, the events that took place, and why these at-
tempts were ultimately unsuccessful. I discuss the electoral damage in 
2008 caused by Chen Shui-bian’s (䲣≤ᡱ, Chen Shuibian) corruption 
scandals, young activists’ support for the DPP, and the impressive 
victory of the KMT’s Ma Ying-jeou (俜㤡ҍ, Ma Yingjiu) in the 2008 
presidential race. I go on to examine the leadership shift in the DPP 
shortly after the party’s 2008 electoral defeat, the role of youth pol-
itics in Taiwan’s recent political development, Ma’s second-term win 
(by a smaller margin) in January 2012, and the Sunflower Student 
Movement and 2016 presidential and legislative elections.  
The present analysis consists of nine sections. The first addresses 
theoretical observations of young people’s apathy towards politics. 
The next section reviews the KMT’s authoritarian past, its gradual 
acceptance of local opposition groups, and how the young Taiwanese 
eventually made their demands for a fully fledged democracy heard. 
The section after that describes the political capital of youth (trendy 
politics), humbleness, being the underdog, and exuding “cleanness” 
during the 2000 presidential campaigns. Thereafter, how this humble 
and moderate approach differs from the radical anti-Chinese nation-
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alistic approach the Green camp organised for Chen’s 2004 re-elec-
tion strategy will be demonstrated. Using primary sources, the section 
that follows that presents the KMT’s Youth League, formed in Janu-
ary 2006 as a consequence of the party recognising the need to attract 
young voters, to have them participate in party politics, and to secure 
the next generation of political leaders. The section after that discuss-
es the DPP’s Youth Council, which was formed five weeks after the 
KMT’s youth wing. The section thereafter examines the successes 
and failures of each party’s youth strategies, drawing on the views of a 
young, pro-independence activist and the results of the 2008 presi-
dential election. The last two sections discuss a number of topics: 
Ma’s administration; the Wild Strawberry Student Movement (䟾㥹㧃
䙻अ, ye caomei yundong); remarks made in England on 9 June 2011 by 
the new leader of the DPP, Tsai Ing-wen (㭑㤡᮷, Cai Yingwen); 
Taiwan’s politics after the continuation of a KMT leader in the presi-
dency; the Sunflower Student Movement (ཚ䲭㣡ᆨ䙻, taiyang hua xue 
yun); and the addition of two new youth political parties, the New 
Power Party (NPP, ᱲԓ࣋䟿, Shidai Liliang) and the Social Demo-
cratic Party (SDP, ⽮ᴳ≁ѫ唘, Shehui Minzhudang), to the electoral 
ballots, which contributed to the KMT’s humiliating defeat in the 
presidential and legislative elections held on 16 January 2016.  
Young People: Disengaged and Apolitical 
O’Toole et al. claim that the current democratic deficit is associated 
with young people having little interest in voting and in formal pol-
itics in general. They argue that the notion of politics “is constrained 
by a narrow definition of political participation and a top-down re-
search methodology” which results in only two categories: political 
participation and political apathy (non-participation) (O’Toole et al. 
2003: 45–46). These results are gathered by employing “quantitative 
methods, which, in striving for parsimonious explanatory models, can 
make crude simplifications.” O’Toole et al. describe this methodo-
logical flaw through the following example: 
An individual who does not vote, or engage in other conventional 
activities, but who is active informally in the local community 
campaigning against racism, might be characterised by mainstream 
research as politically apathetic. This ignores and misclassifies a 
range of individuals and, furthermore, comes close to setting the 
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boundaries of what is to be considered as legitimate political par-
ticipation. (O’Toole et al. 2003: 48) 
O’Toole et al. also point out that much of the mainstream literature 
of political participation fails to assess “particular circumstances and 
issues that affect young people.” There is no differentiation “between 
the arenas in which young people, as distinct from adults, might be 
engaged” (O’Toole et al. 2003: 48). In other words, attempts to under-
stand why this new generation are simply not interested in politics fail 
to answer this question because existing methods and their scope are 
self-limiting, thereby excluding and dismissing young people’s legiti-
mate political concerns, expectations, and choices.  
In trying to explain youth political participation in the United 
Kingdom, Madsen Pirie and Robert Worcester refer to the “Millen-
nial Generation,” which they define as “young adults who reach the 
age of 21 just before or just after the turn of the millennium” (Pirie 
and Worcester 1998: 8). Pirie and Worcester claim that the idea of 
having a job for life is something of the past for the Millennial Gen-
eration. They are “more ferociously brand-conscious than their pre-
decessors,” and they are “the first Internet generation” (Pirie and 
Worcester 1998: 9). Regarding their attitude towards politics, Pirie 
and Worcester’s research reveals interesting findings. Their surveys 
show that “young people are not deterred from voting in local elec-
tions because it is difficult or awkward, but because they cannot be 
bothered” (Pirie and Worcester 2000: 13). Young people have little 
time to think about the future of political processes from a national 
perspective or to participate at a local level (Pirie and Worcester 2000: 
13). 
Young people want to be “the doers and the go-getters who will 
transform tomorrow’s world” (Pirie and Worcester 2000: 24); how-
ever, they are not interested in being the activists “on a social or 
community level” (Pirie and Worcester 2000: 24). Pirie and Worcester 
suggest that their “findings indicate that the ignorance which they 
[young people] profess about community and social institutions is 
indeed based on their low valuation of them” (2000: 24) – primarily 
because young people think there is no need to know. “Citizenship, 
insofar as it involves participation in the community, is the big turn-
off” (Pirie and Worcester 2000: 24).  
Rys Farthing rightly argues that there is a democratic deficit in 
Western democracies. Through education, there have been attempts 
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to “‘fix’ the deficit in young people,” and “make politics ‘cool’ to 
seduce young people” (Farthing 2010: 183). Farthing notes that 
“cool” musicians have helped to build a political brand, rather than 
reflect the voice and concerns of this generation.  
This cool hunting is at best an inauthentic exercise that runs the 
high risk of being counterproductive, as young people become 
even more cynical about the value of their “culture” and opinion. 
(Farthing 2010: 183)  
Farthing refers to civic education programmes in England, Scotland, 
and Australia and discusses efforts to teach “apathetic young people 
about the importance of politics” (Farthing 2010: 184). Politicians 
have also tried to “‘sell’ themselves by appealing to a youthful mar-
ket” (Farthing 2010: 184) through popular music, such as Tony 
Blair’s Britpop movement using Oasis and Blur, Italy’s Silvio Ber-
lusconi using Bono, and the holding of popular music events in the 
United States and Australia (Farthing 2010: 184). 
According to Ulrich Beck, young people “practise a highly polit-
ical disavowal of politicians” and “hate organisations for their formal-
ism and their convoluted and dishonest call for ‘selfless’ commit-
ment” (Beck 2001: 158). Beck suggests that  
all parties are suffering because the “me generation” may partici-
pate in demonstrations and in circulating petitions, but it finds the 
business of organised politics, with its debates on agendas and 
proposals, intensely boring. (Beck 2001: 158–159) 
Beck also states:  
Young people have finally discovered something for themselves, 
something to make adults panic: fun, fun sports, fun music, fun 
consumption, fun life. But politics, as currently practised and rep-
resented, has nothing at all to do with fun. On the contrary, it acts 
like a dead-certain killjoy and hence young people are unpolitical, 
according to superficial impressions and in their own understand-
ing, but in a very political way. (Beck 2001: 158–159) 
Even though Beck is referring to young people in Western Europe, 
and the other authors speak of youth in Western societies, these the-
oretical observations could still shed some light on youth attitudes 
towards politics in Taiwan. They could help explain why Taiwan’s 
Millennial Generation appears to be apolitical and disengaged in party 
politics and political affairs in general. In what follows, I argue that in 
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spite of differences between the West and the East, modern global 
societies share striking similarities, particularly as Asian societal and 
cultural trends have shifted due to the gradual implementation of 
consumerism as an ideology (the embodiment of neo-liberal atti-
tudes) and as a way of life around the world.  
Using primary and secondary material, in the coming empirical 
sections I draw on Pirie and Worcester’s use and definition of the 
term “Millennial Generation” and on Farthing’s observations about 
the use of “cool musicians” for party campaigning, and I further 
highlight parallels between Taiwan’s youth and Beck’s “fun” and “me 
generation” commentary. The next section reviews the increase in 
youth involvement in Taiwanese politics and examines Taiwan’s shift 
from an authoritarian system to a democratic one. Drawing upon my 
extensive research on party modernisation strategies aimed at increas-
ing young people’s political engagement, I analyse the relationship 
between young people and politics in this new Asian democracy – a 
democracy built on party modernisation strategies that seek to en-
courage young people to take an active role in party politics. 
Historical Background 
Following the KMT’s exile to Taiwan in 1949, its main priority was to 
rebuild its military power and return to the mainland. As a conse-
quence of the one-party system, via local elections, Taiwanese were 
incorporated into the KMT apparatus. Martial law provided the re-
gime with a legal framework for repressing dissent, censoring publica-
tions, and outlawing new political parties (Long 1991: 189). By the 
late 1960s, Taiwanese were permitted to elect a small number of legis-
lators, thus giving the opposition a platform to demand democratic 
reforms and intellectuals a platform to launch pro-democracy publi-
cations. These two groups later formed the Dangwai Movement (唘
ཆ䙻अ, dangwai yundong, “outside the party movement”) (Rigger 2001: 7).  
The movement attracted people from all sectors of Taiwan’s so-
ciety. Shelley Rigger notes that “their backgrounds and ideologies 
varied widely.” Nevertheless, they “shared one common goal: they 
wanted the Taiwanese to throw off centuries of foreign domination 
and rule themselves. They wanted democracy” (Rigger 2001: 7). In De-
cember 1979 a demonstration commemorating International Human 
Rights Day in the city of Gaoxiong (儈䳴) turned violent and became 
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a key event in the history of Taiwan’s democratisation. Eight Dang-
wai members were indicted on subversion charges and tried in mili-
tary courts. Future key political figures Chen Shui-bian, Frank Hsieh  
(䅍䮧ᔧ, Xie Changting), and Su Tseng-chang (㰷䋎᰼, Su Zhen-
chang) were part of their legal defence team (Rigger 2001: 20–21). In 
September 1986 Dangwai members founded the DPP.  
When martial law (known as the White Terror, ⲭ㢢 ᙆ, baise 
kongbu) ended in 1987, the KMT was a fundamentally different party. 
As Dafydd Fell puts it, the KMT  
had almost ceased the slogan of recovering the Chinese mainland; 
instead it increasingly based its legitimacy on its economic record, 
democratic reforms and electoral performance. (Fell 2005: 12) 
The Taiwanese-born president, Lee Teng-hui (ᵾⲫ䕍, Li Denghui), 
accelerated the institutional changes Chiang Ching-kuo (㭓㏃഻, Jiang 
Jingguo) had started. In March 1990 the Wild Lily Movement (䟾Ⲯਸ
ᆨ䙻, yebaihe xueyun), made up of university students, demanded that 
Lee Teng-hui further dismantle the KMT’s authoritarian structure 
and advance democratic reforms. 
Constitutional revisions concluded with the first direct presiden-
tial elections in 1996. Nonetheless, despite Lee Teng-hui’s popularity 
and ability to push through institutional reforms, corruption scandals 
gave the KMT the shameful “black gold” image (Fell 2005: 12). In-
ternal party conflict also fragmented the party. During the 2000 presi-
dential election, the DPP benefitted from an internal KMT rift be-
tween Lien Chan (䙓ᡠ, Lian Zhan), the party’s presidential candi-
date, and James Soong (ᆻᾊ⪌, Song Chuyu), a maverick who decid-
ed to run as an independent (Mattlin 2004: 168).  
Taiwanese were successfully indoctrinated into China’s National 
Consciousness, which the KMT had been implementing since 1949. 
Nonetheless, the KMT recognised that reinforcing an authoritarian 
one-party system was an unsustainable strategy. This opened the door 
for Taiwanese citizens to politically express their views, which even-
tually led them to form the DPP, which was considered a “local” 
political party. Reference will be made to the historical context pre-
sented in this section. As the main goal of this analysis is to highlight 
the relationship between young people and party politics, the next 
section examines how Taiwan’s Millennial Generation voters were 
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attracted to the message the DPP used to promote its 2000 presiden-
tial candidate. 
Young and New: The Electoral Strategy
The DPP’s 2000 presidential campaign used various techniques (e.g. 
television ads) to portray their 49-year-old candidate, Chen Shui-bian 
(A-Bian), as a humble Taiwanese, a famous dissident lawyer, and a 
trustworthy leader. Gary Rawnsley (2004) claims that the decision to 
use Chen’s nickname A-Bian as a brand was a political and financial 
success. A-Bian–branded merchandise included everything from T-
shirts to dolls, coffee mugs, key rings, and more. The Bianmao, “an 
olive green hat with a tag featuring A-Bian, a small, cute character 
that represents but bears no likeness to Chen Shui-bian” was an easily 
identifiable product that united Chen’s supporters (Rawnsley 2004: 
214–215). According to Rigger,  
the A-Bian epic encompasses his rise from poverty, his wife’s dev-
astating injury and dogged recovery, his jail sentence, unexpected 
victory in 1994, and unexpected loss in 1998. For his supporters, 
Chen Shui-bian, the self-styled “Son of Taiwan,” is an icon whose 
personal struggles over the past fifty years mirror those of his 
country. (Chen 2000: 52; cited by Rigger 2001: 189) 
A-Bian products were identity symbols that charmed young Taiwan-
ese voters with their rather innocent and cute designs. They brought 
together common Taiwanese – especially the young, who were capti-
vated by the hopes and dreams A-Bian represented. Chen’s own pol-
itical persona was a symbolic construction that provided hope and an 
imaginary promise for the common people of Taiwan. During the 
2000 presidential election campaign, A-Bian was effectively marketed 
as the epitome of many Taiwanese. With a moderate, cute, and harm-
less symbol (similar to Hello Kitty), the DPP managed to create a 
powerful electoral ticket. Internal conflict in the KMT and allegations 
of corruption also boosted the leadership change A-Bian represented.  
An opinion poll conducted on 23 January 2000 revealed that 43 
per cent of 20- to 29-year-olds would vote for Chen Shui-bian; 30 per 
cent, for James Soong; and 15 per cent, for Lien Chan (the KMT 
candidate) – 10 per cent were undecided (TVBS Poll Centre 2000). 
The polls proved to be quite accurate, as Chen Shui-bian won with 
39.3 per cent of the vote, while James Soong and Lien Chan secured 
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36.8 per cent and 23.1 per cent, respectively (CEC 2000). The young 
vote played a key role in the DPP’s first presidential victory. On 23 
October 2001 Tien Hsin (⭠⅓, Tian Xin), the DPP’s director of the 
Department of International Affairs, said that  
if people are satisfied with the present economic development and 
are unwilling to destroy the status quo, then we know we do not 
need to go that far yet. In this situation the DPP must take a more 
pragmatic position, a more flexible position. (Fell 2005: 122)  
The possibility and realisation of electing a young leader previously 
excluded from a position of power presented an opportunity to con-
struct a new hegemonic project in Taiwan. Those who had previously 
challenged the system became victims of the White Terror. Thus, 
Chen’s victory in the 2000 presidential election effectively symbolised 
the emergence of a new Taiwan. By the 1990s, the KMT’s Chinese 
hegemonic identity had started to blur, being slowly displaced by a 
new form of political identification (e.g. the Wild Lily Movement) 
that demanded fully fledged democracy. As Rigger puts it, “Chen 
Shui-bian’s political career spotlights key elements of the A-Bian 
phenomenon like ‘joy, passion, and tears.’” Chen became the man 
who captured “the most true feelings and devotion of the Taiwanese 
people” (Rigger 2001: 189–190).  
A-Bian’s presidential victory was of great socio-political signifi-
cance for Taiwanese society. As one young Chen supporter was quot-
ed in a BBC interview as saying, “Maybe 10 years from now, I’ll be 
able to show this A-Bian T-shirt to my children and say: Ten years 
ago, Taiwan experienced people power.” The article went on to state, 
“Chen’s campaign focused on the issue of money, politics, and cor-
ruption, pervading the KMT’s decades-long rule” (BBC News 2000). 
However, A-Bian fever quickly subsided. In January 2001 an assistant 
manager of the A-Bian Hat Factory said it was “a bad time to talk 
about any products related to President Chen, especially with the 
unfavourable situation and bad economy” (Taipei Times 2001).  
Understandably, Chen’s 2004 re-election campaign required a 
new form of narrative that carried a radical and direct message. The 
newly unified KMT (for the first time in opposition) used Chen’s 
poor handling of the economy to appeal to young voters. Youth sup-
port for the DPP had been natural because young people either chal-
lenged the KMT’s authoritarian, corrupt, and Chinese past or fol-
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lowed family political lines. Hence, targeting Taiwan’s Millennial 
Generation was not required at this stage.  
The 2004 Presidential Election: “228 Hand-in-
Hand” and Taiwanese Consciousness 
Four years of DPP incumbency created the opportunity for Taiwan-
ese democracy to engage in fundamental debates about national iden-
tity, the past, and the future of this rather undefined nation/province. 
Governmental power gave pro-independence political forces the 
opportunity to finally define the meaning of an independent Taiwan-
ese hegemonic identity.  
For the 2004 presidential election, the DPP discursively articu-
lated a clear message to the nation: reflect on the country’s horrific 
past, bring to an end the authoritarian structure that forced people to 
identify themselves as Chinese, defend Taiwanese land from a poten-
tial military invasion, and protect Taiwan from pro-unification main-
landers. This was a radical campaign strategy that sought to crystallise 
the meaning of Taiwanese Consciousness. By reviving and reinter-
preting previously suppressed emotions, the DPP apparatus success-
fully mobilised Taiwan’s popular base at the national level.  
The 228 Hand-in-Hand Rally (228Ⲯ㩜Ӫ᡻⢭᡻䆧ਠ⚓, baiwan 
renshou qianshou hu Taiwan) was a Chen re-election campaign strategy 
that was organised by the pan-Green camp, which consisted of the 
DPP and the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU, ਠ⚓ൈ㎀㚟ⴏ, Taiwan 
Tuanjie Lianmeng, a party founded in 2001 by Lee Teng-hui, the 
former leader of the KMT and ex-president of the Republic of Chi-
na). This peaceful demonstration consisted of more than one million 
people creating a human chain nearly 600 kilometres long to protest 
China’s military threat (Taipei Times 2004). Living in the south of Tai-
wan (Gaoxiong) in 2004, I observed that this form of political cam-
paigning was promoting more antagonism and mistrust in society. My 
reading was that the pan-Green machinery, now without fear of con-
sequences, wanted to mobilise the masses to finally express their 
previously repressed Taiwanese Consciousness. The image of the 
humble and cute A-Bian from the 2000 presidential campaign was 
transformed for his 2004 re-election bid, and his politics changed 
accordingly. 
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The pan-Blue camp in 2004 was an alliance between presidential 
candidate Lien Chan (KMT) and vice-presidential candidate James 
Soong (People First Party, PFP, 㿚≁唘, Qin Min Dang). Each had 
previously run for president in the 2000 elections, combining to win 
61.9 per cent of the vote, which, though it led to the eventual DPP 
victory, also laid the groundwork for the future pan-Blue alliance. 
According to a poll during the run-up to the 2004 election, however, 
the pan-Blue camp was performing poorly amongst young voters: 
only 38 per cent of 20- to 29-year-olds said they would vote for Lien, 
whereas 48 per cent indicated they would vote for Chen (despite his 
“us–them” nationalistic campaign); the remaining 14 per cent were 
undecided (TVBS Poll Centre 2004). This 10 per cent difference 
proved key on election day, as Chen won re-election in a close con-
test, with 50.1 per cent to Lien’s 49.9 per cent (CEC 2004) – a differ-
ence of only 29,518 votes. However, the opposition claimed that 
Chen benefitted from sympathy votes after he and his vice-presiden-
tial candidate were shot whilst campaigning. On 4 November 2004 
the High Court confirmed Chen’s victory, but by the smaller margin 
of 25,563 votes. On 17 June 2005 the Supreme Court further exam-
ined problematic votes and again reduced the margin of victory, this 
time to 16,109 (Supreme Court 2005).  
The combination of a pro-independence president, divisive anti–
pan-Blue discourse, electoral events commemorating Taiwan’s trau-
matic past, and Taiwanese nationalism gave the people of Taiwan the 
opportunity to brush aside Chinese doctrines and collectively express 
what Taiwanese Consciousness (ਠ⚓᜿䆈 , Taiwan yishi) meant to 
them. A fundamental shift occurred when Chen, the “Son of Tai-
wan,” was democratically elected as president: it initiated a phase of 
national identification. The awakening of Taiwanese Consciousness in 
2004 unveiled new ethnic and socio-political terrain. The question is, 
however, did young voters support this new interpretation of Tai-
wanese Consciousness? In the following sections, I aim to identify 
the extent to which Taiwanese Consciousness has influenced the 
country’s Millennial Generation (from a party-political perspective).  
After Chen’s re-election in 2004, the KMT formed a youth wing 
in order to forge a direct link to young voters. The party hoped that 
the popularity of Ma Ying-jeou (part of the KMT’s new generation), 
who had been mayor of Taibei since 1998 and would become party 
chairman in July 2005, would modernise the party’s image. In January 
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2006 Ma announced the launch of the KMT Youth League (Young 
KMT). Five weeks later, the DPP responded with the DPP Youth 
Council. To explain the methods and the aims of these competing 
“youth” wings, I draw on interviews conducted with party organisers 
from both the KMT and the DPP between 2006 and 2008.  
KMT Youth League 
After the party’s narrow defeat, Ma – the new KMT chairperson and 
2008 presidential candidate – identified the need for a youth wing 
that could persuade young Taiwanese to support the KMT, partici-
pate in party politics, and take a leading role in the modernisation of 
the party. In order to compete with the DPP’s natural ability to at-
tract young supporters, the KMT had to find ways to exploit Ma’s 
youth, good looks, and popularity. After two presidential defeats, the 
KMT recognised that as a political brand the party had to change its 
image to resonate with the electorate – similar to how the British 
Labour Party successfully did in the 1990s with its motto “new La-
bour, new Britain.”  
Cementing the youth vote has been of great importance in Tai-
wan’s presidential elections since 2000. Table 1 gives an outline of the 
changes in Taiwan’s electoral market and the numbers of new eligible 
voters (20 is the minimum voting age) that political parties have to 
persuade to support their presidential candidate:  
Table 1. New Voters 
Year Registered voters Voter turnout (%) New voters 
1996 14,313,288 76.04 
2000 15,462,625 82.69 1,149,337 
2004 16,507,179 80.28 1,044,554 
2008 17,321,622 76.33    814,443 
2012 18,086,455 74.38    764,833 
2016 18,782,991 66.27    696,536 
In my view, youth support played a key role in Chen’s ability to in-
crease the number of votes he won from 4,977,697 in 2000 to 
6,471,970 in 2004 – an increase of nearly 1.5 million votes. He 
achieved this feat despite running a nationalistic campaign and over-
  Taiwan’s Millennial Generation 143 

seeing a sluggish economy during his first term in office. Lien and 
Soong received a combined 7,590,485 votes in the 2000 presidential 
election. However, the Lien–Soong ticket garnered only 6,442,452 
votes during the 2004 election, representing a loss of 1,148,033 votes 
for the pan-Blue camp. It is possible that a considerable chunk of the 
19.72 per cent (3,255,460) of registered voters who abstained were 
only “moderate” pan-Blue supporters. After all, the Lien–Soong alli-
ance essentially lacked a convincing narrative. Still, I argue that effec-
tive campaigning strategies targeting young voters were, and still are, 
key determinants in Taiwan’s presidential elections. It seems that 
political leaders from the KMT’s old guard failed to resonate with 
young voters. It is with this in mind that Chairman Ma organised the 
formation of the Young KMT (People’s Daily 2006). To shed some 
light on the objectives and strategies of this new KMT youth wing, I 
carried out interviews with Young KMT organisers five months after 
its foundation.  
According to Lee Je Hwa (ᵾଢ㨟, Li Zhehua), the executive of-
ficer of the Young KMT,  
Chairman Ma aims to establish change in the party with youth par-
ticipation. He wants to touch people’s hearts through the Young 
KMT. Unfortunately, senior party members are still sceptical 
about the Young KMT. Attempts to modernise the party are seen 
as nasty retirement tactics. (Interview 1 2006)  
Lee went on to say,  
[The way the KMT] communicates with young people is dull 
compared with the DPP. Our objective is to improve our pres-
ence in universities and organise campus tours with Chairman Ma 
delivering speeches. (Interview 1 2006) 
Lee also noted that “national identity and employment influence one 
another. We support the status quo. Government policies must help 
increase employment opportunities for young people” (Interview 1 
2006).  
As Lin Yi Shih (᷇⳺ц, Lin Yishi), a KMT legislator and head of 
the KMT youth wing, pointed out,   
The KMT lacks young people’s involvement because it is regarded 
as old and conservative. When the KMT was in power, it was dif-
ficult for young people to participate in community affairs. Polit-
icians were re-elected again and again, and hence blocking oppor-
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tunities for newcomers. This explains why the DPP has been so 
successful in attracting young people. (Interview 2 2006) 
Lin went on to say,   
We want to show that the KMT is changing. Ma’s clean image and 
popularity can make the difference and attract young people. 
However, using “Ma” as a brand will only help us get the votes we 
need to win the 2008 presidential election. Our main objective is 
to transform the KMT’s reputation. (Interview 2 2006) 
Referring to the pan-Green camp, Lin added,  
There are politicians promoting divisive conflict using national 
identity for party electoral propaganda. Previously, some Taiwan-
ese felt [they were] being treated unfairly and discriminated 
[against] by the Chinese. However, why are they encouraging 
young people to hate Chinese today? This is a difficult task be-
cause there is no logic or reason behind it. (Interview 2 2006)  
These interviews reveal interesting aspects about the Young KMT. Its 
main focus was to market Chairman Ma’s image at universities and 
open a channel for young Taiwanese to get involved in party affairs. 
By using Ma, they hoped to finally get rid of that ghost of authoritar-
ianism – evidenced by events such as the 228 Incident (ҼҼޛһԦ, 
er er ba shijian) and the era of the White Terror – that still haunted the 
KMT’s image. I got the impression that the KMT’s White Terror 
apparatus was seen as something of the past and should therefore not 
interfere with current politics, and that it is unlikely to be used to 
persuade young Taiwanese. In terms of national identity, the KMT 
takes an indefinite status quo position.  
Referring to the nationalistic identity, the KMT claims to be 
Taiwanese. This is interpreted as a shift from Chinese Consciousness 
to Taiwanese Consciousness. Still, the party was founded in China, 
and leaders like Lien Chan, James Soong, and Ma were born on the 
mainland. Moreover, internal party practices are still influenced by the 
operational mechanisms (ޣ㌫, guanxi) the KMT employed when it 
was forced into exile in 1949. In order to win the hearts and minds of 
the electorate, the KMT has been trying to shake off its Chinese past 
and reassure the populace that it is protecting Taiwan’s national inter-
ests and has no hidden reunification agenda. The DPP, the true Tai-
wanese homegrown party, has successfully exploited these salient 
differences to mobilise the masses. It has portrayed itself as the under-
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dog and crafted divisive political rhetoric and campaigning events 
that resonate with nationalistic sentiments. Shortly after meeting with 
members of the Young KMT, I interviewed the director of the DPP 
Youth Council.  
DPP Youth Council 
Thirty-six days after the Young KMT was formed, the DPP launched 
their Youth Council. A Taipei Times reporter noted that the aim of this 
new committee was to encourage youth participation in political af-
fairs and further develop the DPP (Taipei Times 2006).   
According to Tseng Wen-sheng (ᴮ᮷⭏, Zeng Wensheng), dir-
ector of the DPP’s youth development activities,  
The idea of the Youth Council is to organise young people and 
give them proper training. Previously, young people have helped a 
lot; however, the DPP never had a training programme for those 
interested in politics. (Interview 3 2006) 
It is evident that the DPP greatly benefitted from the full engagement 
of young Taiwanese in the phase of political change the DPP strived 
for. However, once in government, the supply of enthusiastic young 
volunteers dropped. Offering young people a specialised political 
training programme was an attempt to market the party and revive 
the extensive support it previously enjoyed amongst Taiwanese 
youth.  
This training programme will carefully explain the economic and 
social policies the government has taken in the last six years. We 
can learn a lot from young people. Training young Taiwanese is 
important for the future of the party. (Interview 3 2006) 
Tseng also lamented the unfortunate “recent news about Chen’s fam-
ily corruption scandals” – not only was it “something that is against 
the DPP’s values” but it “could affect the support we get from young 
people” (Interview 3 2006).  
With regard to the timing of the announcement of the Youth 
Council, Tseng bluntly replied:  
The KMT started with the “China Youth Corps” [ѝ഻䶂ᒤᮁ഻
ൈ, Zhongguo qingnian jiuguotuan]. Now they are trying to copy 
us. The KMT is trying to win the youth vote. The truth is that Ma 
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Ying-jeou is ignoring the past. He secretly thinks Taiwan is part of 
China. (Interview 3 2006)  
Tseng continued,  
We are promoting Taiwan’s national consensus (Taiwanisation). 
Foreign people have ruled Taiwan for many years. The DPP ad-
vocates for the right of Taiwanese to govern this island, not those 
foreign invaders. (Interview 3 2006) 
Tseng added, 
In our recent surveys, young people don’t consider the status quo 
a problem; however, if Taiwan has a war with China, they would 
support Taiwan’s independence. National self-determination is of 
great significance to the DPP. Most of the KMT’s political agenda 
is connected with China. They are not Taiwanese. (Interview 3 
2006) 
Tseng’s comments appear to reveal a well-embedded party template 
to depict the KMT as a representative of China. 
Youth support and a desire to be part of the DPP’s anti-KMT, 
anti-corruption, and pro-democracy struggle was essential for the 
expansion of the party. However, after defeating the KMT in two 
presidential elections, the political attraction of the DPP began to 
erode. It seems that Chen’s corruption charges did in fact seriously 
affect the DPP’s image. As Fell rightly argues, 
The DPP’s failure to really deal with its image of political corrup-
tion meant that the issue remained the dominant issue for the re-
mainder of the DPP’s second term. The KMT was able to win in 
2008 by framing the election as a referendum on Chen’s corrup-
tion scandals. (Fell 2014)  
Furthermore, Taiwan’s Millennial Generation is not like previous 
generations: they appear to be bored with politics, paying more atten-
tion to urgent issues related to employment prospects and economic 
growth.  
The next presidential election was to take place in March 2008. It 
would provide a unique opportunity to assess which youth-wing 
strategy was more effective. The following section draws on field-
work conducted during the 2008 presidential campaign to discuss the 
development of the Young KMT and the DPP Youth Council, the 
activities of young pro-independence supporters, and the election 
results.  
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Youth in the 2008 Presidential Election 
There were 1.8 million more young votes up for grabs (more than 10 
per cent of registered voters) in 2008 than in 2000. Therefore, both 
the KMT and the DPP faced constant pressure to recruit young ac-
tivists and modernise the image of their parties, both of which were 
showing signs of detachment from the needs and aspirations of 
young Taiwanese.  
According to Chen Ping (䲣⊏ᖜ, Chen Jiangbin), executive of-
ficer of the Young KMT,  
Chairman Ma’s visits to university campuses took place. However, 
we failed to get the participation and feedback the Youth League 
was hoping for. It is very difficult for us. Students know that the 
KMT Youth League is trying to reach them. (Interview 4 2008)  
Chen estimated that  
90 per cent of young people are not interested in participating 
with us. They just don’t care. However, they are very concerned 
about the economy. They want an economy that offers job oppor-
tunities and chances to develop their professional skills. (Interview 
4 2008)  
As Chen noted,  
Economic growth is the key. There is no need to compete with 
the DPP in organising events. They make excellent events and 
emotional speeches in Taiwanese (not Chinese). They are not in-
terested in policymaking at all. The DPP is not a political party, 
but a political marketing public relations company. Young people 
support the DPP because there is a lot of “passion” involved. (In-
terview 4 2008) 
However, Chen argued that  
because of corruption charges against A-Bian, young people will 
reconsider their support for the DPP. Our message is very simple: 
inform young people that with the KMT it’d be easier to find 
work. (Interview 4 2008) 
As Tseng himself admitted, the DPP’s Youth Council strategy “got 
nowhere” (Interview 5 2008). Nonetheless, the DPP did enjoy no-
ticeable youth participation during its 2008 presidential campaign in 
spite of the Youth Council’s failure. This included a group of 15 
young Taiwanese campaigning with a clear message (in English): 
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“Love of Taiwan. Reversing the Tide. Protecting Taiwan.” They con-
veyed their concerns about Taiwan to the people during a 22-day, 
510-kilometre walk round the island. The group’s objective was to 
persuade undecided voters to support the DPP. As Samuel Lang (䛾
ᚙ⾪, Lang Enqi), one of the 15 youngsters, stressed,   
This journey wasn’t political propaganda, not even when the DPP 
presidential candidate, Frank Shieh, visited us during our long 
walking trip. Our message was to inform people that we care 
about Taiwan. (Interview 6 2008)  
Another youth-related activity that supported the DPP was “Freddy 
Action.” Freddy Lin, the lead singer of a rock band called Chthonic, 
was the director of the DPP’s youth campaign. Some of the band’s 
lyrics refer to Taiwan’s “loss of national identity and the sometimes 
turbulent history of their homeland recurring themes” (Chthonic 
2009). They make reference to the infamous “228 Incident,” the 
deadliest massacre in Taiwanese history. “Tens of thousands of Tai-
wanese were killed by the Chinese army” (Chthonic 2009). Still, it is 
not clear if these youth activities, which are infused with nationalistic 
sentiments, convinced young people to vote for the DPP. Nonethe-
less, the intention of “Freddy Action,” to use music and celebrity 
status to remind Taiwan’s Millennial Generation of the KMT’s re-
pressive past was to divert attention from the employment challenges 
young people were facing and from Chen’s corruption scandals. As 
Farthing suggests, politicians use “cool” musicians to build a political 
brand but this does not necessarily mean the voice and concerns of a 
generation are represented.  
According to an opinion poll conducted on 21 March 2008, 53 
per cent of 20- to 29-year-old voters would vote for Ma, while 38 per 
cent would choose Frank Hsieh; 10 per cent were undecided (TVBS 
Poll Centre 2008). The polls showed that young people were chang-
ing sides. The election results confirmed this, with Ma Ying-jeou 
(KMT) winning 58.45 per cent of the vote, and Frank Hsieh manag-
ing only 41.33 per cent (CEC 2008).  
It appears that the Young KMT’s tactic of focusing on Chen’s 
poor economic performance was effective. Their claim was that with 
Ma in government, economic development and employment oppor-
tunities were possible – something which had been seriously hindered 
by Chen. Furthermore, Ma’s clean image vis-à-vis Chen’s embarrass-
ing corruption allegations seriously damaged the DPP’s Hsieh–Su 
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ticket, and Ma’s “new” KMT reaped the electoral rewards. Some of 
the debatable sympathy votes Chen received after the shooting inci-
dent before the 2004 election became protest votes in 2008. I argue 
that had Chen not been facing corruption charges, the DPP would 
have been able to maintain its 2004 electoral base (1,027,021 votes 
were lost in the meantime) and, potentially, beat the KMT in the 
presidential race for the third time in succession. Instead, they were 
defeated by 2,214,065 votes in what can only be described as a hu-
miliating loss. After the DPP’s eight years in power, Taiwanese pol-
itics underwent a great shift.  
Ma’s Government, the Wild Student Strawberry 
Movement, and the 2012 Re-Election 
Ma’s prime objective was to revive the sluggish economy he inherit-
ed. Nonetheless, the attempt to improve Taiwan’s economy was slow, 
due to an unprecedented global recession. President Ma instigated a 
set of economic ties with China to redress the imbalance in the trade 
flow between the two sides in order to boost Taiwan’s economy. 
However, Ma’s quick decision to improve relations with China 
opened a set of criticisms about his true intentions for Taiwan and, in 
turn, his plans to initiate a re-unification process with the mainland.  
Less than six months after taking office, students showed their 
discontent with Ma’s administration. On 6 November 2008, some 
500 university students from the National Taiwan University organ-
ised a sit-in protest in front of the Executive Yuan to demonstrate 
against the visit of Chen Yulin, the chairman of China’s Association 
for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits. Eventually, the students were 
violently cleared by the police. The movement was sarcastically called 
the Wild Strawberry Movement by students, capturing the older gen-
eration’s perspective of the younger generation as being soft as 
strawberries – pampered consumerists who lacked political beliefs. 
The Wild Strawberry Movement went on to protest against the re-
cently approved Assembly and Parade Law (Taipei Times 2008). Ac-
cording to Lin Huan-yi (Lin Huanyi), a member of the Wild Straw-
berry Movement, following these initial demonstrations, “Student 
protests extended to other cities of Taiwan. Students organised them-
selves using an online student BBS blog forum” (Interview 7 2009).  
Lin Huan-yi notes that  
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the DPP tried to blend in with the students and introduce political 
practices into the movement. We made it clear to the DPP, we 
didn’t want to be part of their political agenda. (Interview 7 2009) 
By June 2009, however, Lin says that  
it became obvious that the movement lacked radical objectives. 
There was no clear direction and students no longer paid any at-
tention to the organisers […;] even the government ascribed no 
importance to our claims and demands. We wanted to reconstruct 
the Wild Lily Student Movement. The difference is that Wild 
Strawberry students mainly came from a middle-class upbringing, 
and didn’t have a clear socio-political agenda. Wild Lily students 
were different. (Interview 7 2009)  
Students wanted to be part of something “cool” and challenge the 
establishment; however, when the novelty factor wore off, students 
found no reason to protest. In other words, when that element of 
“fun” Beck describes died out, the Millennial Generation (the soft, 
pampered consumerists) returned to their “me generation” world of 
selfies and ideological consumerism.  
Even though these theoretical observations refer to the behav-
iour of youngsters in Western liberal democracies, I argue that these 
viewpoints travel and thus provide valuable insights into how this 
student-led event started, spread, and declined in this democratic 
Asian society. The Wild Strawberry Movement provided Taiwan’s 
“Internet Generation” with exciting moments, making them feel like 
the “doers and the go-getters” in a society where traditional political 
parties had failed to provide a stage for citizens to openly express 
their views and actively influence government policies. 
According to one member of the Young KMT, young people 
joining the Young KMT with the intention of moving up the political 
ladder will be disappointed, as those without family connections in 
the KMT have no room for progress. At present, young people who 
move up through the selective KMT party structure are those with 
the right family connections (guanxi). Within the KMT, it is difficult 
to express one’s views to senior party members. The DPP still has a 
flat structure and thus provides opportunities to young people. How-
ever, as the DPP party structure matures, young people with strong 
party connections could overshadow any newcomers (Anonymous 1 
2009).  
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The DPP has also had to go through a process of diversification 
in order to revive its popularity, as a result promoting a more suitable 
political approach to a rapidly changing society. After the rather em-
barrassing defeat in the 2008 presidential election, the DPP selected 
Tsai Ing-wen as the chairperson of the party. Unlike her predeces-
sors, Tsai was not involved in the political struggle during the White 
Terror period. Instead, she had pursued an academic career before 
joining the DPP in 2004. Tsai faced veteran Su Tseng-chang (㰷䋎᰼, 
Su Zhenchang) in a close race for the presidential nomination. The 
decision to select Tsai was a clear sign that the DPP wanted to evolve 
and transcend its political platform. The DPP’s emphasis on Tsai’s 
status as the first female presidential candidate and her academic 
background reveals the party’s attempt to rebrand itself and be seen 
as the less agonistic “new DPP.” This change in approach could sig-
nal the end of anti-KMT and anti-China discourse as well as indicate 
the DPP’s attempt to mobilise the masses by demonising a construct-
ed enemy (rather than a political opponent), using the Hoklo dialect  
(䯙ই䃎, minnanyu) as a tactic.  
During a speech at SOAS, University of London, on 9 June 
2011, Tsai pointed out that “there used to be a qualification for Tai-
wanese politicians to become a leader; that is, you have to spend 
some time in jail before you get elected.” She went on to say that 
since the 2008 defeat, however, that “even though the old guard still 
[hasn’t] accept[ed] change, many other DPP members [have] recog-
nised that change is needed.” Tsai argued that “the DPP is primarily 
dominated by men who communicate using Hoklo.” Tsai said of the 
beginning of her tenure, “My Taiwanese was poor. I could hardly 
communicate with people. However, after three years as chairperson, 
I have learned Taiwanese. Now, I can speak to the public. This is 
another qualification to be a leader of the DPP.” She acknowledged 
that her selection as came under fire due to her “language inability” 
and lack of “revolutionary”’ credentials. Nonetheless, she contends 
that many “have recognised that it is time for the party and Taiwan to 
change. Electing a woman educated abroad shows that the DPP still 
is a progressive party” (Tsai 2011b). 
In a presidential campaign ad, Tsai tried to capitalise on her aca-
demic background and experience overseas. The video clip starts with 
shots taken during her visit to Europe from May to June 2011 – ac-
companied by messages in English stating: Where are you? Taiwan, what 
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do you want? Taiwan, where are you going? What’s next? TAIWAN NEXT. 
Tsai reminisces about her days in London and what she learned dur-
ing her doctoral studies at the London School of Economics. She 
recollects that a particular professor had stressed that rational think-
ing and respect ultimately brings prosperity to a society. She also 
highlights the importance of integrating Taiwan into the world (Tsai 
2011a). This ad attempted to demonstrate that the DPP’s political 
platform had been modernised with a new type of leadership. Its 
objective was to convince voters that Tsai, a Taiwanese woman who 
has an international, rational, and progressive outlook could make 
Taiwan a prosperous country. Tsai using the English language, study-
ing overseas, and being a Taiwanese representing the country abroad 
all served to carefully target new voters.  
In the seminar and campaign ad, Tsai tried to market the DPP as 
a new and moderate political party. Her story about the party-internal 
resistance to change and how she could revive the DPP into a pro-
gressive party once again has opened a new phase of this “pro-inde-
pendence” political project. She claimed that none of her “revolu-
tionary” predecessors had actually offered anything new. Tsai wanted 
to connect with Taiwanese – using a different approach. Without 
having to mobilise the masses with a “previously repressed” Taiwan-
ese Consciousness discourse, the electoral backing of grassroots sup-
porters is guaranteed. Tsai’s strategy is to convince Taiwan’s Millen-
nial Generation, whose views of politics and whose individual needs 
and desires differ from those of older generations, of the merits of 
the DPP. Tsai’s “non-revolutionary” and international academic 
background, her moderate outlook, and her being the first woman to 
run for the presidency offered a new form of politics in Taiwan.  
According to a 29 December 2011 opinion poll, 44 per cent of 
20- to 29-year-olds said they would vote for Tsai; 38 per cent, for Ma; 
and 10 per cent, for James Soong – the other 14 per cent were unde-
cided (TVBS Poll Centre 2011). Nonetheless, Ma was re-elected with 
51.60 per cent of the vote (6,891,139), which represented a loss of 
767,875 votes from 2008. Tsai received 45.63 per cent of the vote 
(6,093,578), which was 648,629 votes more than the DPP got in 
2008. Soong received 2.76 per cent of the vote (369,588) (CEC 2012). 
For the 2012 election, 764,833 new young Taiwanese were included 
on the electoral register. In 2008 the polls stated that 58 per cent of 
20- to 29-year-olds would vote for Ma. However, Ma’s popularity 
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with young voters seemed to have dropped by 20 per cent by 2012. 
Student protests (e.g. the Wild Strawberry Movement), direct eco-
nomic accords with China, and an inability to turn the economy 
around were factors that contributed to the decline in Ma’s approval 
rating.  
Tanguy Le Pesant notes that even though Tsai was leading in the 
polls, Ma somehow managed to obtain a slight lead over his rival less 
than a week before the election. Based on interviews and discussions 
conducted in the framework of his research on young voters, despite 
those voters agreeing with Tsai’s campaign – which consisted of criti-
cising Ma’s broken promises – Tsai failed to win over part of the 
young vote because she did not offer an alternative, but simply at-
tacked Ma’s record, a strategy which was initially very effective but in 
the end fell short (Le Pesant 2012: 79). Understandably, a proportion 
of young voters expected a clearly articulated government plan rather 
than attacks days before they cast their votes. Nonetheless, compared 
with previous DPP candidates, Tsai brings a new leadership style. 
Young people are more likely to connect with Tsai’s moderate, studi-
ous, international, and modern political approach than they are with 
the emancipation and independence narrative her party predecessors 
used to stoke people’s emotions.  
The advancement of the DPP greatly depends on it continuing 
to modernise, which is based on balancing radical groups with a new 
generation of moderate forces in the party and rejecting the divisive 
“us–them” politics seen during 2004 presidential campaign. In line 
with the changing dynamics of the world economy, the DPP has to 
articulate rational party policies and define how all Taiwanese can be 
part of and participate in the growth of a stable country, irrespective 
of political colour.  
Before concluding this analysis of youth movements, it is neces-
sary to examine the Sunflower Student Movement, which emerged 
after Ma’s 2012 re-election. Although this anti-KMT movement was 
based in part on youth uncertainty and identity, it was actually unex-
pected and generally non-partisan in nature. It is thus considered 
important because it gives us a glimpse of how Taiwan’s youth might 
participate in party politics and vote during the 2016 presidential 
election.  
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The Sunflower Student Movement and the 
KMT’s Electoral Defeats
On the night of 18 March 2014, more than 200 (mostly college) stu-
dents broke through the police line guarding Taiwan’s Legislative 
Yuan and occupied the Legislative Chamber. Students wanted to 
lodge a protest against the KMT’s cross-Strait Service Trade Agree-
ment (STA) bill. The next day, approximately 20,000 gathered outside 
the Legislative Yuan to support the student protest. Five hundred 
police officers confronted the protestors but failed to expel the stu-
dents from the Legislative Chamber. Bill Cho (ঃ༛ᱝ, Zhuo Shi-
zhao), vice minister of the Ministry of Economics, claimed that if 
students continued to block the cross-Strait STA in the Legislative 
Yuan, South Korea would accelerate their negotiations on a free trade 
agreement with mainland China, and Taiwan would lose a precious 
opportunity to gain the upper hand. Cho explained that employers 
found it difficult to raise wages because Taiwan’s service industry is 
limited to a small domestic market and that the ratification of the 
STA would enable young Taiwanese to find additional job opportuni-
ties on the mainland (All Taipei Newspapers 2014a).  
Five days after students occupied the Legislative Yuan, Premier 
Jiang Yi-hua (⊏ᇌ⁪, Jiang Yihua) went there to speak with the stu-
dents and underline the importance and necessity of the STA that 
President Ma was proposing. However, the student protestors reject-
ed the president’s defence of this controversial agreement and de-
manded Jiang’s resignation and an apology from Ma. The protestors 
later demanded that Ma withdraw the STA and “legislate a ‘Statute 
Governing Oversight on Cross-Strait Agreements’ as a precondition 
to start dialogue” (China Times 2014a). Ma responded with a press 
conference describing the role of the STA, failing to address not only 
the protesting students, but the Taiwanese people as a whole. Ma was 
speaking to those individual taxpayers working hard to elevate Tai-
wan’s competitiveness. They have no time for Internet forums or 
engaging in online debates. The student occupation might cultivate a 
few new-generation DPP candidates and remind Taiwan how divided 
this society is – for example, reunification versus independence, Blue 
versus Green, northern versus southern Taiwan, old versus young, 
and rich versus poor (China Times 2014b). 
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Ma responded to student representatives by inviting them to the 
Presidential Palace for talks. The student leader Lin Fei-fan (᷇伋ᐶ, 
Lin Feifan) replied, stating that he was willing to engage in dialogue 
with the president in an open forum to break the deadlock over the 
STA. Still, Ma’s administration knew the students were opposed to 
matters other than the STA, such as the KMT government’s per-
ceived cosying up to the mainland and failure to obtain the best terms 
for Taiwan. According to the KMT, such accusations are simply not 
true. Government agencies have held a total of 110 small-scale semi-
nars with representatives from the domestic finance, video game, 
exhibition, shipping, printing, cosmetics, food, travel, advertising, and 
logistics sectors. Also, in 2013 three meetings were held in the Legis-
lative Yuan in which the terms of the STA were discussed with the 
DPP, the KMT, the TSU, the PFP, and independent legislators. Ma 
has repeatedly emphasised that the Legislative Yuan must pass the 
agreement “solely for the sake of the future of Taiwan’s economy.” 
For the government, these are merely “policy” issues. “But for the 
DPP and the protesting students, these are reunification vs. inde-
pendence issues” (China Times 2014a).  
The perception that Ma and the KMT have a “Chinese Con-
sciousness” and have thus failed to protect and secure Taiwan’s inter-
ests seems flawed. It would perhaps be more appropriate to describe 
the Ma administration as having a “Taiwanese Competitiveness” 
mindset. As Sunflower students continued to occupy the Legislative 
Chamber, people opposing the protest began to voice their disap-
proval. On 3 April 2014 the National Development Council released 
the results of a survey showing that 57.6 per cent of respondents 
hoped the students would leave the Legislative Chamber to allow the 
Legislative Yuan to resume normal operations, while 48.6 per cent of 
the respondents agreed that the STA should be returned to the Inter-
ior Committee (ޗ᭯င଑ᴳ, neizhang weiyuanhui) and reviewed article 
by article. Furthermore, 69.3 per cent of respondents denounced the 
students for occupying the Cabinet House, destroying and stealing 
public property, and clashing with the police (The United Daily News 
2014a).  
Anti-Sunflower rallies were organised by people calling them-
selves “Carnations,” a flower representing motherhood. They called 
on the students to leave the Legislative Chamber so that the public 
might consider the issue calmly. They also expressed their disapproval 
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of the students’ decision to hang the national flag upside down (All 
Taipei Newspapers 2014b).  
David Brown, a former US foreign service officer and a profes-
sor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, 
wrote in a letter to the Nelson Report that in the week before 17 
March the DPP had repeatedly prevented the planned article-by-
article review of the STA at the Legislative Yuan committee level. 
The student occupation of the Legislative Chamber suited the DPP’s 
agenda to prevent the planned review of the STA. Brown claims in 
the letter that “the KMT has accused the DPP of instigating this 
action” (The United Daily News 2014b). According to the KMT’s offi-
cial website, “many believe the accusations” (The United Daily News 
2014b). The day after the students stormed the Legislative Chamber, 
Su Tseng-chang, Tsai Ing-wen, Frank Hsieh, and Yu Shyi-kun (⑨䥛
ำ, You Xikun) joined the students in support outside the Legislative 
Yuan (The United Daily News 2014b). 
Whether there was contact between Sunflower leaders and pro-
independence parties before and/or after the occupation is still un-
clear. Nonetheless, theoretical observations can help us explain the 
Sunflower Movement from a different angle and thus better compre-
hend what makes Taiwan’s Millennial Generation tick. Following the 
start of his first term in 2008, Ma implemented a clear trade policy 
with China. He also had to deal with students protesting trade pacts 
with China. The Wild Strawberry Movement offered students a 
trendy, controversial, and exciting medium through which to chal-
lenge the authorities. However, when the frenzy faded, students lost 
interest. Drawing on Beck’s theoretical use of “fun,” students in-
volved in the Sunflower Movement had fun besieging the Legislative 
Chamber for 23 days and demanding the resignation of the premier, 
an apology from the president, and the withdrawal of the STA.  
The Sunflower Movement was better organised than the Wild 
Strawberry Movement and effectively challenged Ma’s administration. 
It enabled students to express their concerns that the KMT govern-
ment was gradually accepting further integration, therefore complying 
with China’s hegemonic economic superpower operations – some-
thing which could ultimately limit Taiwan’s ability to manoeuvre and 
independently decide its economic and political future. However, the 
Sunflower protestors lacked an understanding of the economic signif-
icance of the STA for Taiwan’s future and disregarded the small-scale 
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seminars with industry representatives and the meetings in the Legis-
lative Yuan. Regional integration (e.g. the European Union, the 
North American Free Trade Agreement, and the Mercado Común del 
Sur) is generally beneficial for all countries involved, whereas isola-
tion in an ever-growing globalised world could seriously affect Tai-
wan’s long-term competitiveness.  
My reading is that, for the protestors, the STA became a symbol 
of Taiwan’s future subordination to its powerful and threatening 
neighbour. They were convinced that they were defending the under-
dog against the KMT’s hidden reunification agenda. The STA repre-
sented not a policy issue but rather an unfavourable direct economic 
link with China. The whole issue became a manifestation of the battle 
between those who champion reunification versus those who cham-
pion independence. By besieging the Legislature Chamber, “go-get-
ter” students believed they were at the forefront of defending the 
nation. As Brown notes, on 18 March high-ranking DPP politicians 
showed their support for the students in the gathering outside the 
Legislative Yuan. The DPP used this anti-KMT protest as a strategic 
opportunity to be seen and to recruit more Millennial Generation 
activists.  
As Pirie and Worcester argue, involvement in the community 
and being interested in social institutions is a “big turn-off” for the 
Millennial Generation. They want to be the “go-getters who will 
transform tomorrow’s world”; however, participation and direct en-
gagement “on a social or community level” is not for them. Even 
though the students’ strategy succeeded in challenging Ma’s admin-
istration, they had no desire to take their protest further by using 
established anti-KMT party machinery. Instead, student leaders opted 
to campaign for seats in the 2016 legislative election by forming their 
own alternative political parties (this will be discussed later). As Beck 
states, the “me generation” may take part in demonstrations and ral-
lies, among other things, but organised politics and participation in 
debates on agendas and proposals is “intensely boring” for them. It 
seems that the Sunflower Movement had no intention of engaging 
with the political establishment through formal policy and political 
processes after occupying the Legislative Yuan chamber. Instead, by 
forming new political parties, students were able to keep and, ulti-
mately, transcend that element of authenticity and Millennial Genera-
tion rebelliousness. 
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The victory of Ko Wen-je (ḟ᮷ଢ, Ke Wenzhe), an independent 
(backed by the DPP), in the mayoral election in Taibei less than two 
years before the 2016 presidential election could be widely interpreted 
as a test of confidence in Ma’s China-friendly government (Hung and 
Gold 2014). Also, between 28 September and 15 December 2014, 
more than 30,000 protestors (known as the Anti-China Umbrella 
Movement) illegally occupied the centre of Hong Kong. The protes-
tors campaigned for fully free elections to be held in the city. Beijing 
showed no willingness to compromise on the issue of universal suf-
frage. (Hong Kong’s Chief Executive is picked by an election com-
mittee – with members most of whom are loyal or sympathetic to 
Beijing. Hongkongers want to elect the Chief Executive themselves.) 
The narratives of these anti-China student protests in Hong Kong are 
geopolitically different from those in Taiwan; however, Taiwanese 
“doers and go-getters” may understandably foresee a similar abuse of 
democratic rights in Taiwan should China’s gradually increasing in-
volvement in Taiwanese domestic affairs not be contested early on.  
Nevertheless, facing a situation that many other countries in the 
world have struggled with, Ma had little option but to trade and es-
tablish direct links with China, an emerging economic superpower. 
The fact is, many taxpayers and other individuals and business sectors 
that depend on the mainland to expand their business activities (i.e. in 
the generations older than the Millennials) share Ma’s “Taiwanese 
Competitiveness” logic. In this context, nationalism becomes sec-
ondary.  
For the 2016 presidential and legislative elections, student leaders 
formed two political parties in early 2015 and became legislative can-
didates. The New Power Party (NPP) won 5 of the 113 seats in the 
Legislative Yuan, receiving 6.11 per cent (744,315) of votes cast (CEC 
2016). In addition to various Sunflower student leaders, Freddy Lin – 
the lead singer of the rock band Chthonic and the director of the 
DPP’s 2008 youth presidential campaign – also became an NPP legis-
lator. The second new party was the Social Democratic Party (SDP), 
which advocated around issues such as economic development, social 
equality, and the environment. The SDP had a smaller campaigning 
force and thus decided to form an alliance with the Green Party (㏐唘, 
Lüdang). Of the 11 district candidates of the alliance between the 
Green Party Taiwan and Social Democratic Party (㏐唘⽮ᴳ≁ѫ唘㚟
ⴏ, Lüdang shehui minzhudang lianmeng), six were SDP members. 
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Despite receiving 2.52 per cent (308,106) of the vote, the alliance 
failed to win a seat in the Legislative Yuan.  
According to an opinion poll conducted on 12 January 2016, 62 
per cent of 20- to 29-year-old voters said they would vote for Tsai 
Ing-wen (DPP); 13 per cent, for the KMT candidate Eric Chu (ᵡ・
ٛ, Zhu Lilun); and 10 per cent, for James Soong (PFP). Fifteen per 
cent were undecided (TVBS Poll Centre 2016). These figures suggest 
that young voters wanted another party in power. The election results 
revealed just how unpopular the KMT had become. Tsai won with a 
comfortable majority of 56.12 per cent (6,894,744), whereas Chu 
received only 31.04 per cent (3,831,365) of the vote. Meanwhile, the 
veteran Soong received 12.84 per cent (1,576,861) of the vote in what 
was his third attempt at winning the presidency. Of the 64 seats the 
KMT had won in the 2012 legislative election, it managed to keep 
only 35 in 2016. The DPP won 68 seats; the NPP, 5; the PFP, 3; and 
an independent, 1. Turnout was 66.27 per cent, the lowest in Tai-
wan’s history (CEC 2016). Due to the set of circumstances discussed 
earlier, Tsai and the other legislative candidates representing the DPP, 
NPP, SDP–Green Alliance, and so on, were more attractive nomi-
nees for Taiwan’s 696,536 new voters.  
An interview with Shaina Wang (⦻ሦ㩡, Wang Baoxuan) – a 
former independent candidate who joined the SDP when she decided 
to campaign on the SDP–Green Alliance ticket in Taoyuan City (ṳൂ
ᐲ) (Constituency 1) – after the January 2016 elections reveals key 
aspects about people’s perceptions of traditional party politics and 
the need for alternative political movements. Wang decided to join 
because “the policies of the alliance focused on local issues” (Inter-
view 8 2016). Whilst campaigning, some voters had told Wang: “We 
are not going to vote because we don’t have anyone to vote for. 
There is no difference between the KMT and the DPP” (Interview 8 
2016). Wang also said that  
many people expected change when a DPP candidate replaced a 
KMT mayor in December 2014. However, nothing has changed. 
People now think that politicians are only concerned about their 
interests and how to make money. (Interview 8 2016) 
Wang noted that  
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being young and educated was a plus point. Some of my 15,802 
(8.68 per cent) voters were KMT supporters. Indeed, I contribut-
ed to the defeat of the KMT incumbent. (Interview 8 2016) 
Wang also pointed out that  
the NPP got elected because they have “stars” and they speak 
simple things like “we need to give the power back to the people” 
and “we need to stand up for Taiwan.” They also had a successful 
campaign because they had a lot of resources. (Interview 8 2016)  
Although both youth-based political parties had different policy strat-
egies, it seems that the NPP’s success consisted of “Taiwanese Con-
sciousness”-charged slogans advocated by student/musician “stars” 
who enjoyed media-driven “doer and go-getter” celebrity status and 
ample campaign resources.  
Less than a month before election day, I asked young people in 
the south of Taiwan about their views on the political system. Disap-
pointed with the KMT, Joanne Wang (⦻㼅Ἣ, Wang Yufen) said,  
I voted twice for Ma and the KMT ticket. Now, I feel that they 
seem to be more interested in protecting the interests of powerful 
business tycoons – for example, the Wei family oil cooking scan-
dal. (Interview 9 2015; see Huang 2014)  
Wang also said:  
I cannot accept the way they changed a leader. The KMT nomi-
nated Hung Hsiu-chu [⍚⿰ḡ, Hong Xiuzhu] as the party’s presi-
dential candidate; however, shortly afterwards Eric Chu replaced 
her. The party is in a shambles. Thus, I’ve decided not to vote. 
(Interview 9 2015)  
Chris Tang (ୀަ⾯, Tang Qilu), a young Taiwanese in his early thir-
ties, said:  
I have two young kids and I am very concerned about the future 
of Taiwan. The KMT is a liability for Taiwan because they seem 
to be more interested in pleasing China […] than representing and 
protecting us. (Interview 10 2015)  
Against this backdrop, the KMT has been forced to do some soul 
searching after an embarrassing defeat in the 2016 presidential and 
legislative elections. Before looking to attract young and new voters, 
the party needs to examine what the KMT represents as a political 
brand in Taiwan’s vibrant democratic society. The DPP electorally 
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exploited this unique opportunity to return to the presidency and 
secure its first-ever majority in the Legislative Yuan. Outside tradi-
tional party political structures, Taiwan’s Millennial Generation has 
found a platform to challenge the KMT and make politics fun. Never-
theless, the decision of 6,334,689 (33.27 per cent) potential voters not 
to vote suggests that people generally are disillusioned with the polit-
ical system and how democracy is evolving.  
Conclusion 
The relationship between youth and politics in Taiwan has gone 
through different phases in the last three decades. Young Taiwanese 
played a crucial role in forming and expanding the Dangwai Move-
ment, forming the DPP, and demanding a fully fledged democracy 
during the 1990 Wild Lily Movement. I have argued that the cute and 
fresh A-Bian brand helped the DPP to gather youth electoral support 
in the 2000 presidential race. In order to win the “hearts and minds” 
of the country’s youth, Ma organised the formation of the KMT 
Youth League in January 2006. Shortly afterwards, the DPP launched 
its own Youth Council. 
In spite of the KMT’s efforts to convince young people that pol-
itical participation is not “boring,” a big “turn-off,” or a “killjoy,” the 
party’s attempt to modernise failed. Interviewees pointed out that the 
majority of young people have little interest in participating with the 
KMT; those who do are blocked by the engrained party guanxi prin-
ciples: without family connections, there are no opportunities. The 
KMT’s century-old baggage has made it difficult for the party to truly 
reinvent itself and create a strong youth base. The DPP Youth Coun-
cil’s “specialised political training programme” also failed. Further-
more, Chen’s corruption scandals damaged the DPP’s image and 
credibility and turned off Taiwan’s Millennial Generation. Nonethe-
less, following its 2008 presidential election defeat, the DPP, with its 
Taiwanese roots and swift decision to recast its political stance 
through a change to its leadership, became better placed to win the 
“hearts and minds” of young Taiwanese. With an approval rating at 
above 60 per cent among from voters aged 20 to 29 in the lead-up to 
the election, it is near certain that young voters played a key role in 
Tsai’s presidential victory and the DPP securing a majority in the 
Legislative Yuan in January 2016.  
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Two anti-China trade-pact protests (the Wild Strawberry and 
Sunflower Movements) organised and carried out by Taiwan’s Mil-
lennial Generation during Ma’s administrations are key indicators that 
youth participation in and electoral backing of the KMT are less likely 
in the near future. During the 2008 presidential campaign, Ma prom-
ised both economic growth and employment opportunities for young 
people. The combination of Ma failing to deliver on his promises and 
the potential risks of the trade pacts that Ma and the KMT wanted to 
sign with China provided the DPP with an ideal political climate in 
which they were able to exploit the KMT’s falling popularity and 
succeed in the January 2016 presidential and legislative elections. 
Young people were disenchanted with the establishment, corrupt 
practices, and self-interested politicians, which resulted in young Tai-
wanese forming new political parties and having “fun” campaigning 
and – for some – winning Legislative Yuan seats. Ultimately, these 
events have opened up exciting fast-track career opportunities for a 
new breed of Taiwan-conscious politicians who have bypassed the 
organised candidate-selection processes in traditional political parties. 
These new political movements have provided voters of all ages with 
the opportunity to cast a protest vote and support a new era in Tai-
wanese politics.  
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